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Introduction
The informal or underground economy is a widespread phenomenon, not only in developing countries but also in developed ones. In 2003 the size of the informal sector represented, on average, a 17% of the GPD in the OECD economies. In southern European countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain the informal sector accounted for up to a 30% of the GDP. The reasons for participating in the informal economy are highly debated in the literature (see Schneider and Enste, 2002) , and range from pure tax evasion to a last resort activity in the face of high unemployment. fraudulently by means of false documents; or legally through a temporary visa or permit (i.e. tourist or family-visit visas) followed by an overstay. They may also include asylum seekers who do not leave the hosting country if the application is denied. 2 Even if immigrants hold legal status they may be irregularly hired in the informal labor market, especially when underground activities are already common in the economy, as they are in southern Europe. 3 This paper documents the relationship between immigration and the size of the informal labor market in Spain over the last decade. During this period the percentage of the foreign born population shifted from 3% in 1998 to 14% in 2009. This inflow represented one of the major migration waves in recent history and clearly reshaped the structure of the Spanish labor market (see for example . At the same time, the restrictive immigration policy and the weak border and work place enforcement stimulated the growth of illegal alien employment. In the attempt to draw immigrants out of the back economy the government conducted a series of amnesties.
1 Estimates based on a number of different methodologies (OECD, 2009) . 2 Estimates of the distribution of unauthorized immigrants by modalities for a number of countries suggest that overstay is the most common form of illegal immigration. 3 Among the OECD countries for the period 1999-2001, Greece, Italy and Spain had the largest shadow economies, at approximately 30% of GDP. In the middle group were the Scandinavian countries and at the lower end were the United States, Austria and Switzerland at 10% of GDP (Schneider and Enste, 2002) .
The most recent one in 2005 received 691,655 applications for regularization out of which 572,961 were approved. 4 5 In this paper we also investigate the effectiveness of this large and contested regularization process in decreasing the size of the informal labor market.
Research on this topic is scarce mainly due to the difficulty in measuring illegal immigrants and the size of the informal economy (Chiswick, 1988) . Only a few developed countries such as the United States, Australia, Japan and Korea release regular statistics on this issue. Our estimates of the contribution of immigration to the size of the informal labor market in Spain are based on comparisons between the official employment records of the Social Security and that in the Labor Force Survey. The first includes workers with a legal working contract while the second reflects the number of people legally or illegally engage in an economic activity. Our identification strategy exploits the cross-regional correlation in the difference between these two employment measures and the immigration inflow into each region over the last decade. We instrument the current distribution of immigrants across Spanish regions using historical immigration settlements in the country (i.e. an instrument based on ethnic networks).
Our findings point to a strong relationship between immigration inflows in a region and the discrepancies between registered and total employment. In particular, a 10 percentage points increase in the share of immigrants in a region increases informal employment by 3 to 8 percentage points, depending on the specification. We also find that the 2005 amnesty which regularized hundreds of thousands immigrants, while reduced the stock of illegal aliens, did not affect the relationship between immigration inflows and the size of the informal labor market.
The next section presents a brief description of the Spanish immigration history and its related policy. Section 3 contains a description of the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy followed by our results and some concluding comments.
Immigration to Spain
International migration to Spain has been on a rising trend since the mid-1990s, with labor migration taking on a greater role since the early 2000s. The foreign born population jumped from 1,173,767 in 1998 to 6,466,278 in 2009 (see Figure 1 ). The yearly stock of immigrants is measured from the Registry data annually collected by each municipality. Immigrants have strong incentives to register as this grants free access to the health and educational system. Registration also represents a valuable piece of evidence to prove residence in the country in the event of future amnesties.
Thus the numbers obtained from the Registry provide an accurate estimate of the size of the foreign born population, including undocumented aliens.
The economic expansion during the last decade has made of Spain a very attractive destination. Moroccans, for their geographical proximity, Latin Americans, given the small cultural gap and common language, and other Eastern European groups, mainly Rumanians, represented the bulk of immigrants over this period. 6 The construction boom attracted male low-skilled workers, whose spouses or relatives found jobs in the care giving and service sector.
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The scarcity of legal entry channels to fill low skilled jobs suggests that a substantial proportion of the foreign born population entered the country illegally or overstayed once their visa or temporary permission expired. Even when holding a legal status immigrants are frequently hired irregularly as it is a cheap and flexible alternative for employers to cover their labor needs. Among the main concerns raised by informal employment are: i) the weak social protection for the workers themselves; ii) the fact that informal employment is often a trap which offers few prospects to improve careers; iii) its consequences for workers in the formal economy, who suffer unfair competition and have to pay higher taxes than in the absence of informal employment; iv) potential rewarding of tax evasion and corruption associated with government inability to enforce the rule of law.
In what follows we investigate the contribution of immigration to the size of the informal labor market. We conduct a spatial correlation approach and exploit the variability in immigrant density and unregistered employment across Spanish regions over the period 2000 to 2009. Crucial to our identification strategy are the important differences in the regional concentration of immigrants over the period. For example, the immigrant share, defined as the working age foreign born population over the total working age population, shifted from about 5% to more than 25% in regions along the Mediterranean coast, such as Murcia, Girona, and the Balearic Islands, while it remained below 5% over the all period in some Southern regions (Córdoba, Jaén y Badajoz).
Data
Gathering information about underground economic activity is difficult, because no one engaged in such activity wants to be identified. Disagreement persists about definitions and estimation procedures (see Schneider and Enste, 2002) . Regarding its definition, the OECD (1986) proposed to define "concealed employment" as "employment (in the sense of the current international guidelines on employment statistics) which, while not illegal in itself, has not been declared to one or more administrative authorities...". The EU (1998) similarly defines "undeclared work" as "any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory system of member States. Applying this definition, criminal activities would be excluded, as would work not covered by the usual regulatory framework and which does not have to be declared...".
We relay on the previous definitions of informal employment and use the data available in Spain to quantify the contribution of immigration inflows to the discrepancies between the employment recorded in the Spanish Labor Force Survey,
LFS, (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA) and the number of legal contracts in the Social Security records, SS.
The Labor Force Survey collects quarterly information on the employment status of the household members in Spain. In the survey a person is considered to be employed if he or she did some work for pay during the week previous to the interview. The survey does not distinguish between formal and informal employment. As those in an irregular employment situation have less incentives to declare their economic activities, Below we assess the contribution of immigration to the discrepancies between the employment recorded in the Labor Force Survey, that should include legal and illegal workers, and that in the Social Security records, that include only legal workers.
As becomes clear from the previous discussion, we can not interpret the difference in employment between the two data sources as solely due to informal employment.
However, we next argue that our analysis allows us to draw some conclusions on the impact of immigration on the size of the informal labor market.
Our empirical approach correlates annual changes in the differences between employment in the LFS and the SS records and changes in immigration densities across provinces between 2000 and 2009. Our conjecture is that immigration has increased the size of the informal labor market as many immigrants enter the country illegally and even if they hold a legal status they are illegally hired by employers. Our strategy will identify the contribution of immigration to the illegal economy under the assumption that the methodological discrepancies between the LFS and the SS records are constant over time or unrelated to immigration flows.
As already mention the LFS will only capture a lower bound on the size of the informal labor market as temporary foreign workers and individuals not living in households are not included in the survey. These two type of individuals, particularly those in the former group are likely to have increased with the immigration boom of the 2000s. Regarding other type of workers that contribute to the differences between the LFS and the SS records, we think that it is reasonable to assume that civil servants affiliated to a private security system, members of the clergy and self-employed with a second contract have remained a constant fraction of the population or that their variation are not related to immigration flows. The two type of workers that contribute to the differences in employment between our two data sources and which percentage in the population may be related to immigration are agriculture workers employed on a temporary basis and workers in the household service sector. We investigate the robustness of our results by excluding these workers from the analysis.
Empirical Analysis
The core of our analysis employs the differences between the Labor Force Survey and Social Security records. We do not claim that those differences are an unbiased estimate of the size the informal sector in Spain. What we do claim is that those differences are informative about the evolution of the size of the informal economy over 
The Empirical Model
To investigate the effect of immigration on the discrepancies between the Labor Force Survey and the Social Security records we estimate the following empirical model:
where rt  is the difference between the number of employed individuals in the Labor Force Survey and those in the Social Security records in region r and year t. The difference is normalized using the number of employed individuals in the Labor Force Survey in the corresponding cell (r,t). Our main explanatory variable is the share of immigrants, immigrant_share rt , defined as the percentage of working age foreign born individuals over the total working age population in a given region, r, and year, t.
Notice that equation (1) includes year, t  , and regional, r  , fixed effects, thus identification of our main coefficient of interest,  , comes from comparing changes in the differences between the LFS and the SS within regions and over time, in high versus low immigration regions.
As argued in the previous section the difference between the LFS and the SS records do not only respond to undocumented work. However, as long as changes in this difference unrelated to irregular activities are constant over time or within regions, or uncorrelated to the stock of immigrants (e.g. the size of the clergy, self-employed workers with a second contract or civil servants with private affiliation), the  coefficient in equation (1) will identify the effect of immigration on the size of the informal labor market. We think this is a reasonable assumption, particularly when we exclude from the analysis workers in the agriculture sector.
We also investigate the effect of the 2005 amnesty on the size of the informal labor market. The aim of the regularization process was to legalize the employment of the large number of illegal aliens (see Figure 2) , and thus decrease the size of the shadow economy. 
The amnesty Identification of the model coefficients in equation (1) and (2) exploits the geographical differences in the concentration of immigrations across Spanish provinces.
As in previous immigration studies, the spatial correlation approach adopted here may suffer from endogeneity if the flow of immigrants towards particular regions is not exogenous to the particular economic phenomena we are interested in. In order to circumvent this problem we employ the classical instrumental variable approach based on ethnic networks. This approach isolates the variation in immigrant concentration across provinces that results from recent immigrants locating in regions with large communities of previous immigrants from the same country of origin.
More formally, consider the following predictor for the size of the immigrant population in a region r in a given year t:
for t 0 <t. The term in brackets denotes the share of the foreign-born population from country of origin c living in Spain's region r in some base year t 0 . As discussed below the base year in this analysis is 1991. FB c,t is the total size of the population from country c residing in Spain in year t. We obtain the instrument by adding up the predicted share of immigrants by country of origin in each region, Z r,t , and normalizing it by the working age population in the cell (r,t).
The instrument based on ethnic networks has been widely used in the US (Card 2001 ), but less in countries with a much recent immigration history such as Spain.
Intuitively The second assumption that the instrument requires is that the immigrant settlements established before 1991 have to be able to predict the location decisions of new arrivals from the same country 8 to 18 years latter. This assumption can be tested in our first-stage regressions, from where we can assess the predictive power of the predicted share of immigrants in explaining the current distribution of immigrants across Spanish provinces. We present the first-stage results shortly, but first we focus on the OLS estimates of the models in equation (1) and (2). Table 1 present the estimates of the models in equation (1) and (2) respectively.
The dependent variable in both equations, the difference in employment according to the LFS and the SS records normalized by the level of employment in the LFS, is measured as an annual average for the period 2000-2009. 10 We use the Population Registry to compute the annual share of foreign born population at the regional level.
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Thus our sample consists of 500 observations (10 years and 50 Spanish provinces 12 ). To obtain robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix we weight the observations using the province population at time t.
Column (1) and (2) in Table 1 report the OLS estimates of the model in equation (1) Columns (3) and (4) in the same table report the IV estimates of the model when using the ethnic networks instrument. If we first examine the first-stage results associated to these regressions and reported in Table , we can conclude that our instrument, the predicted share of immigrants, is a strong predictor of the current regional distribution of immigrants. A coefficient of , with a t-statistic and an associated F-test clearly rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments. The IV estimates in columns (3) and (4) In interpreting the effects of the 2005 amnesty one should bear in mind that the regularization occurred during the largest economic expansion of the Spanish 10 Note that the LFS is a quarterly survey, while the information in the SS records is released on a monthly basis. 11 See Farré, González and Ortega (2010) for a discussion on the advantages of using the Population Registry in measuring the local concentration of immigrants in Spain. 12 We exclude Ceuta and Melilla from the analysis as the concentration of immigrants in that region was already very high at the beginning of the period. economy in decades. While the amnesty managed to legalize many immigrants (about 600,000) and thus reduced the size of the black economy, illegal aliens continued to enter the country attracted by the many job opportunities available. Our estimates indicate that the amnesty was indeed unsuccessful in affecting the relationship between immigration and the size of the informal labor market.
Robustness checks
In Table 2 we conduct a series of checks to assess the robustness of our results. First, since the agricultural sector may be responsible for part of the inconsistencies between the LFS and the Social Security records, we estimate the same regressions as in Table 1 but using data only from the manufacturing and the service sector. The results reported in column (1) and (2) of Table 2 indicate that the relationship between immigration and the informal sector are reinforced when the agricultural sector is excluded from the sample.
Columns (3) and (4) show the unweighted regressions. The results are qualitatively the same as in Table 1 but quantitatively stronger indicating that the relationship between immigration and the informal sector is stronger in provinces with less population.
Finally columns (5) and (6) try to control for any labor market characteristics that can spuriously generate the observed relationship between immigration and the size of the shadow economy. In particular, one could suspect that provinces with particular labor market characteristics or industry structure are more prone to both receive more immigrants and have more unregistered work. Using data from the LFS in 2000 we calculate the participation rate, unemployment rate, share of occupied population in the industry, service and construction sectors. We allow for different provinces to have different trends of unregistered employment along those dimensions. We do not find any significant differences with previous results.
Conclusions
The economic expansion in developed countries during the last decade has led to an With this paper we uncover an important positive relationship between immigration and the size of the informal labor market. We also show that amnesties are not effective in affecting this relationship, at least if they are implemented during periods of high economic growth. Accordingly, guest-worker programs and a stronger enforcement of the immigration laws, both at the borders and the work place, seem a more effective way to fight illegal alien employment. an informal contract (contrato verbal). Self-employed workers are excluded from the analysis.
